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RE-THINKING THE RIGHT TO WATER: 
ENHANCING SERVICE PROVIDER ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH 
PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS & STRATEGIC PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGATION – SOUTH AFRICAN AND IRISH EXPERIENCES 
Sahara Nankan*
 
 
Abstract: 
Over the past two decades there have been significant legal and policy shifts under both international and 
domestic law towards the recognition of the emerging right to water and sanitation. What unites them is 
their underlying attempt at articulating a suitable human rights approach to the increasingly acute global 
water crisis and the need for enhanced administrative justice in service-provider accountability.  However, 
in doing so the limitations of ‘rights talk’ have crept into the discussion leading to an often paralyzing, and 
unhelpfully polarising, ‘public vs private debate’ in the discourse, as well as a reductionist and one-sided 
policy focus on the substantive right to water in the form of availability, access and quality control with 
scant improvements on the ground. This has led to the significant risk that this right will become a post-
political empty signifier if the challenge of increasing its effectiveness is not met in a more nuanced and 
holistic manner. 
 
This paper therefore analyses the transformative legal potential that procedural rights hold for injecting 
meaningful content to this highly complex and politicised topic. It focuses on the lessons learned from 
public interest litigation failures in South Africa’s water justice movement over the past decade, despite a 
constitutional right to water, and emphasizes the need for enhancing access to information and robust 
community participatory rights. It compares and contrasts this to the recent Irish experience in public 
advocacy opposition to austerity-backed water charges and calls for a right to water in Ireland.  It warns 
of the dangers of superficial or static ‘rights talk’, a misplacement of focus on the ‘public/private’ 
dichotomy and a lack of awareness civil society advocacy might have of the importance of judicial 
interpretation, especially with regards to socio-economic rights which the right to water is inevitably part 
and parcel of. By questioning how political factors may impact upon legal objectives in situ such an 
approach seeks to contribute towards giving this right more practical meaning and relevance in the future.  
Keywords: right to water, administrative justice, Ireland, South Africa, procedural rights 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the 2008 recession in Ireland, mass community mobilisation under the banner of a ‘right to water’ 
successfully opposed the austerity policy of water charges envisaged under the newly formed semi-state 
                                                          
* Sahara Nankan, PhD Candidate at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland Galway. Email: 
s.nankan2@nuigalway.ie. This research was submitted as an LLM thesis for the UCC LLM in International Human Rights 
Law & Public Policy in September 2017, under the supervision of Dr Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, and has been lightly edited and 
updated to reflect recent developments up to September 2018. 
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company Irish Water.2 While as it stands Ireland is a jurisdiction that does not formally recognise an explicit 
human right to water,3 this example of recent domestic public advocacy has led to the government’s 
suspension of domestic water charges and has further undermined Irish Water’s reputation.4 However, a 
future scenario of privatisation and further water charges is not indefinitely precluded5 and as a result, there 
are now calls for a binding right that seeks to preclude private actor participation altogether.6 
 
Yet it is particularly interesting that in South Africa, legal development in this area of human rights law over 
the past decade has raised concerning questions for the normative content and value of recognising a human 
right to water. South Africa is a jurisdiction that is lauded for being amongst the most progressive in the world 
in terms of justiciable socio-economic rights. This includes an explicit recognition of a right to water and 
sanitation under s.27 of the Constitution.7 However, mass public opposition including a watershed public 
interest litigation case has delivered a crushing blow for water justice activists in the country. 
 
Backed by wider advocacy networks, the Mazibuko case8 was brought forward by the Phiri community of 
Soweto wherein the Applicants opposed a government policy of pre-paid water meters. In its seminal but 
heavily criticised judgment the Constitutional Court of South Africa overturned two earlier celebrated lower-
court rulings and upheld the continuation of that policy notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee. 
 
Recent Irish and earlier South African experiences have thereby both attempted to utilise procedural 
elements of human rights law that have predominately espoused community participatory rights and public 
interest litigation, the former evoking a conceptual and the latter an express right to water. Thus far, Ireland 
has successfully opposed water charges envisaged under a semi-state water company deriving justification 
from a conceptual right. South Africa however, has unsuccessfully opposed a state policy of pre-paid water 
meters despite an explicit Constitutional right. Yet given the irony of such contrasting outcomes, what do 
these illustrations tell us, if anything, about the role and potential that these strategies have in enhancing 
the relevance of this emerging right? Equally, what lessons does the illustrative example of South Africa 
provide for Ireland if calls for a legally binding right to water is to be both successful and meaningful? And in 
the final instances, in what way can answers contribute to how this emerging human right is to be shaped 
under international human rights law in the future? 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, broadly-speaking there are two core pillars that underpin the right to 
water notwithstanding its process of formulation or choice of service provider modalities. The first is that of 
                                                          
2 See generally, Right2Water Campaign, available at: www.right2water.ie/ (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
3 See, O McIntyre, ’The Human Right to Water and Reform of the Irish Water Services Sector’ (2014) 5(1) Journal of 
Human Rights and Environment 74. 
4 See, ’Cabinet approves legislation for water refunds and new charging regime: Households will be charged for water if 
they use 70% more than average’ (20 September 2017), Irish Times, available at: 
www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/cabinet-approves-legislation-for-water-refunds-and-new-chargingregime-
1.3227046 (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
5 See, Right2Water Campaign, The Right2Water continues and it will never end, available at: 
www.right2water.ie/blog/right2water-battle-continues-and-it%E2%80%99ll-never-end (last accessed: 5 September 
2018). 
6 Ibid. 
7 See for example, A. Nolan, ’Holding Non-state Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights 
Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) Journal of Constitutional Law 61. 
8 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others CCT 39/09 [2009] ZACC 28 [hereinafter Mazibuko] available 
at: https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Mazibuko-Constitutional-Court-judgment.pdf (last accessed: 5 
September 2018). 
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a substantive right to water, which at the international level is interlinked with sanitation.9 This relates to 
availability, accessibility and quality of water services.9 Given the extent of the global water crisis, this has 
understandably been the cause of much focus.10 The World Health Organisation as well as the United Nations 
Children’s Fund estimate that 894 million people lack access to safe water for personal domestic use11 and 
according to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, where Goal 6 is to ensure access to water and sanitation 
for all, at least 1.8 billion people globally use a source of drinking water that is contaminated.12 Additionally, 
2.4 billion people lack access to basic sanitation services, such as toilets or latrines.13 A second scenario that 
exacerbates this is that freshwater resources are quickly diminishing as a result of anthropogenic 
unsustainable over-use and depletion.14 
 
The second, often less noted, pillar is that of the procedural rights requirements of the right to water and 
sanitation.15 Here elements are centred upon access to information, public community participation in 
decision-making and policy creation as well as justiciability and access to effective legal remedies.16 An 
underlying approach in this paper holds that while prioritising the substantive right to water is commendable, 
the content of the right has placed excessive focus on access and quantity which has not led to significant 
improvements. Therefore, a more nuanced method is needed that also values the transformative legal 
potential of robust procedural rights. Specifically, emphasis needs to be placed on enhanced community 
participatory rights as well as the inter-linking potential of utilising strategic public litigation in a manner that 
builds on the participatory process, in order to provide much-needed meaning to this right.17 
Notwithstanding inevitable inherent limitations, re-orientating attention in the discourse may go further in 
offering greater possibilities for enhanced administrative justice in holding service providers to account, be 
they either state or non-state actors. It may also significantly contribute towards formulating a more 
meaningful normative content to the right at both the international and domestic levels, contributing 
significantly towards its eventual enjoyment and realisation. 
 
In order to illustrate the value of this approach, I first outline a contextual theoretical framework which 
sketches the key developments of an internationally recognised legal right to water and sanitation, touching 
on core limitations of ‘rights talk’ and the unhelpful public/private debate. In doing so, given the human rights 
sensitive nature of water services, I also consider the calls for enhanced service provider accountability within 
international human rights law. I then highlight the potential for re-thinking the normative content of this 
right through greater focus on strengthening procedural rights, particularly public participation and strategic 
litigation. 
 
                                                          
9 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 
11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, para.12, available at: 
www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d11.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018) (hereinafter GC15). 
10 See on this, M. Barlow, Blue Covenant: the Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water, (Black 
Inc, Melbourne: 2007). 
11 See, World Health Organisation & United Nations Children’s Fund, Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water (2010) 
7, available at: www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/9789241563956/en/ (last accessed: 5 September 
2018). 
12 See, UN, Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 6, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/waterandsanitation (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Barlow, Blue Covenant (n.10). 
15 CESCR, GC15 (n.9), para.12. 
16 Ibid. 
17 This is especially so since the above-mentioned figures have remained relatively stagnant despite considerable efforts 
(notwithstanding some improvements) since the 1970’s. See, Barlow, Blue Covenant (n.10). 
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The South African Mazibuko case is analysed as an example justifying the need to re-think the normative 
content of the right to water and place more emphasis on participatory rights. I also discuss lessons for access 
to effective legal remedies and strengthening strategic public interest litigation cases. 
 
Drawing from this framework, I then critically evaluate the recent Irish experience to argue that a legal right 
to water, even if it were to preclude private sector participation, is insufficient to hold service providers to 
account. Additionally, the human rights implications of reforming the Irish water services sector has been 
under-explored in the literature and this paper attempts to highlight some of these lacunae. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss how social struggles inform the discourse, where the courts 
stand, and attention is also focused on forthcoming developments in this field in those jurisdictions. This is 
especially important given the implications the local protection of the human right to water and sanitation 
may have for the global protection context. This paper thereby seeks to contribute to the progressive 
discourse by comparing and contrasting these contemporary yet quite distinct national experiences within 
the framework put forth herein. 
 
In concluding, I submit that these particular socio-legal experiences have sought to frame a comprehensive 
right that is inclusive rather than exclusive. I note lessons and recommendations that can be made for 
strengthening administrative justice in the Irish context as well as how the international human right to water 
and sanitation can be strengthened in a manner that supports and includes communities within their 
respective and differing contexts. This human right is then better viewed, both domestically and 
internationally, not as a static regressive right – reduced to legal-technicist questions of quantity and access 
– but crucially as a dynamic strategic tool that is as fluid and contextually relative as the vital resource of 
water itself. 
 
 
B. CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND 
SANITATION – A NEED FOR ENHANCED ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN SERVICE 
PROVIDER ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
1. The Right to Water and Sanitation under International Human Rights Law 
 
The conceptual notion and origins of a human right to water and sanitation under international law are well-
discussed in the literature.18 Over the past decade in particular, significant legal and policy shifts have moved 
towards the increased recognition of this emerging right, primarily as a result of global civil society advocacy 
movements.19 
 
In the absence of an explicit right to water and sanitation under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
it is argued to be inferred as a derivative right necessary for the full realisation of other interdependent 
                                                          
18 For a more recent detailed overview of the legal development of the right to water and sanitation under international 
human rights law and related issues see for example, I.T. Winkler, The Human Right to Water: Significance Legal Status 
and Implications for Water Allocation (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, United States: 2012). 
19 For an account of the social struggles to recognise water as a human right, see generally, F. Sultana and A. Loftus 
(eds.), The Right to Water: Politics, Governance and Social Struggles (Earthscan, London, United Kingdom: 2012). 
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rights.20 The 2002 adoption of General Comment No.15 by the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights21 
was the first espoused recognition by any UN human rights body of a stand-alone internationally recognisable 
human right to water.22 While GC15 is non-binding in nature, it is a ground-breaking highly authoritative 
interpretation of the normative legal requirements that derive from the relevant provisions of the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.23 State parties to the Covenant are thereby evaluated 
on their legal obligations relating to the relevant provisions of the Covenant.24 GC15 states that ‘the human 
right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is also a prerequisite for the realisation 
of other human rights.’26 With regard to Article 11 on an adequate standard of living, GC15 ‘clearly falls within 
the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one 
of the most fundamental conditions for survival.’27 Interpretation is also derived from Article 12(1) on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health: ‘environmental hygiene as an aspect of the right to health 
… encompasses taking steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from unsafe and toxic 
water conditions.’25 
 
However Tully notes that the ICESCR ‘suffers from a clear lack of immediate enforceability, with Article 2(1) 
merely requiring the state party to ‘take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’26 Yet, it is 
submitted here that this arguably highlights the reason why there have been numerous rapidly expanding 
expressions of this right emerging since the late 1970’s,27 some of which have inevitably led to reasonable 
calls for a stand-alone binding treaty.28 
 
With regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,29 most significantly is Article 6 on the 
right to life that adds further justification for a right to water, ‘since at least a minimum amount of water is 
indispensable to ensure survival.’30 
                                                          
20 Y. Danieli, E. Stamatopoulou and C.J. Diaz, The UDHR: Fifty Years and Beyond (Baywood Publishing Company, 
Amityville, New York: 1999) cited in P.H. Gleick, ’The Human Right to Water’ (1998) 1(5) Water Policy 487, 492. Due to 
this lack of explicit recognition much debated has ensued in the literature as to its legal bases, scope and nature see on 
this, S. McCaffrey, ’The Human Right to Water’ in E. Brown Weiss, L. Boissen de Chazournes and N. Bernasconi 
Osterwalder, Fresh Water and International Economic Law (OUP, Oxford 2005) 93. 
21 CESCR, GC15 (n.9). See also, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No.15, 
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted 20 January 2003, 29th Session, 1, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2003). 
22 McCaffrey, ’Human Right to Water’ (n.20) 101.  
23 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 
3 (hereinafter: CESCR), available at: www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
24 See, M. Williams, ’Privatisation and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century’ (2007) 28 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 469, 475. See further, E.B. Bluemel, ’The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to 
Water’ (2004) 31 Ecology Law Quarterly 957, 972. 
25 CESCR, GC15 (n.9) para 8. There have been many arguments for other derivations such as the right to adequate 
housing for example, which should include sustainable access to safe drinking water, site drainage, sanitation and 
washing facilities, see CESCR, General Comment No.4, Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1)), UN Doc. E/1992/23 
para 8(b). 
26 See S.R. Tully, ’The Contribution of Human Rights to Freshwater Resource Management’ (2004) Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 101, 103. 
27 For a concise timeline see, United Nations, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation Milestones: Factsheet, available 
at: www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/human_right_to_water_and_sanitation_milestones.pdf (last accessed: 5 
September 2018). 
28 See, Barlow, Blue Covenant (n.10). 
29 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
(hereinafter: ICCPR) available at: www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
30 Winkler, Human Right to Water (n.18) 49. See also, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General 
Comment No.6: The Right to Life (Article 6) (30 April 1982) UN Doc.A/37/40 (1982). 
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However the second major international break-through towards its formal recognition occurred on 28th July 
2010 when the UN General Assembly majority adopted a Resolution pertaining to a universal right to water.31 
The Resolution recognises ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is 
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.’32 And whilst it is non-binding it remains equally 
highly authoritative. The Resolution is declaratory of global political will despite relative opposition to its 
adoption;33 41 countries, including Ireland, abstained. Nevertheless, it is submitted that one should be all the 
more cautious not to underestimate the potentially powerful implications of this Resolution. The 122 votes 
in favour carries with it considerable moral and aspirational weight, perhaps the first formal steps towards a 
future binding international right to water and sanitation. 
 
This view is validated in part by the closely followed confirmation from the UN Human Rights Council on 28th 
September 2011, which provides for a legally binding obligation on nation-states to ‘respect, protect and 
fulfil’ the human rights to water and sanitation.34 In addition, state practice is rapidly emerging that supports 
a right to water and sanitation, either on its own or as can be derived from other rights as touched on above. 
Taking the case example herein, South Africa provides one of the earliest, clearest and most progressive 
recognitions of this right, having encompassed it explicitly in its Constitutional Bill of Rights alongside other 
textually prescribed socio-economic rights.35 
 
However, in part due to these developments, there remains much debate as to its normative content. More 
precisely this means that its nature and scope remains highly contentious. In particular, the modalities of 
water service provision, either between the state and non-state actor (i.e. the ‘public-versus-private’ debate), 
has until recently been intensely politicised and has dominated the often obstructively polarising discourse.36 
 
Indeed, the provision of fundamental socio-economic rights goods and services,37 such as access to safe basic 
water and sanitation, are increasingly being transferred from the traditional role of the State, either fully or 
partially, to include non-state actor participation.38 This global trend began in the preceding decade to the 
                                                          
31 UN General Assembly, The human right to water and sanitation: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 3 
August 2010, A/RES/64/292, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/4cc926b02.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
32 Ibid. 
33 See, F. Sultana and A. Loftus, ’The Right to Water: Prospects and Possibilities’, in Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water: 
(n.19) 1-18. 
34 Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/18/1, see summary UN International Decade for Action Water for Life 
2005-2015, available at: www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml (last accessed: 5 September 
2018). 
35 See Part C of this paper infra. 
36 On this and critiquing the debate, see: K. Bakker’s seminal article, ‘The “Commons” versus the “Community”: Alter-
globalisation, privatisation and the human right to water in the global South’ (2007) 39(3) Antipode. 
37 According to the United Nations, economic and social rights include but are not limited to the rights to adequate food, 
to adequate housing, to education, to health, to social security, to water and sanitation, and to work. In short, these 
rights relate to the material means that are necessary in order for individual rights-holders to attain satisfactory 
standards of living within an egalitarian society and the socio-cultural agency to influence such societies. The UN 
maintains that all rights are inter-linked, the distinction between the socio-economic rights and civil and political rights 
resulting from a ’deepening of cold war tensions between East and West’ in the post WWII era. See United Nations, 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/ESCRIndex.aspx (last accessed: 5 September 2018). For constructive scholarly 
accounts see further, A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001); M.A. Baderin 
and R. McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP: 2007); P. O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-
Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge: 2012). 
38 For a recent analysis of this see, K. Moyo and S. Liebenberg, ’The Privatization of Water Services: The Quest for 
Enhanced Human Rights Accountability’ (2015) 37(3) Human Rights Quarterly 619. 
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recognition water as a human right at the start of the ‘neoliberal’ era in the early 1970’s.39 The scope of non-
state actor influence and power has also therefore been significantly expanding. Policy creation mechanisms 
and decision-making processes which mandate the establishment, operational management and realisation 
of these core services such as water and sanitation, are ever more likely to be dependent on the private actor 
participant to some degree or another.40 Such participants primarily include but are not limited to 
international financial institutions (IFI); multinational corporations (MNC); domestic corporations and state-
owned (or semi-state owned) companies including public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
 
Normatively, this phenomenon has attracted much concern and criticism. These have included vexatious 
multi-dimensional questions related to the appropriate ethical, philosophical, political and legal domicile and 
role of non-traditional actors in the provision and realisation of key socio-economic goods and services of 
which water may be considered the most contentious due to its particular socio-environmental 
characteristics (See infra in this section). 
 
Yet, given the historically traditional approach of the state-centric nature of international human rights law,41 
a major underlying issue of the debate has been whether or not private sector participation in water services 
is both wholly justifiable and legitimate. Essentially, international law remains state-centric because states 
ratify treaties and have had, until relatively recently, an unparalleled role in providing such goods and 
services.42 
 
Subsequently, the emergence of ‘market environmentalism’43 has occurred which is ‘the creation of private 
property rights for resources previously governed by common pool resources.’44 It broadly utilises the 
principle of scarcity, wherein proponents argue that because water is an ever-diminishing resource only if it 
is priced at full economic cost can it be allocated as a high value good. The management of water by private 
companies who are accountable to customers and shareholders will ensure maximum accountability which 
is considered more effective (and direct) when contrasted with often floundering political accountability.45 
 
On the other hand, opponents primarily base their arguments on the assertion that water is not simply a 
resource-commodity like any other good or service, it is essential for all life due to its localised and non-
substitutable nature. Furthermore, it also entails multiple (often sacred/spiritual) connotations for different 
                                                          
39 F.G. Isa, ‘Globalisation, Privatisation and Human Rights’, in F.G. Isa and K.D. Feyter (eds), Privatisation and Human 
Rights in the Age of Globalisation, (Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford: 2005). As she summarises, ‘it is clear that liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation spawned by neoliberal globalisation are aimed at reducing the role of the state in 
economic and social systems. As a result, sectors previously covered by the public sector are left in the hands of the 
market’ at 13. 
40 Gaining momentum in the 1990s international financial institutions promoted multinational water companies as a 
panacea to the global water crisis, proclaiming greater efficiency, management skills and technology to water services, 
see Moyo and Liebenberg, Privitization of Water Services (n.38) 693. 
41 A. McBeth, ‘Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to the State’s Human Right’s Duties when Services are 
Privatised?’ (2004) 133 Melbourne Journal of International Law 134. 
42 Ibid, 134-135. 
43 Also known as ’neoliberalising nature’, see Bakker, ’Commons versus the Community’ (n.36) 20. 
44 Ibid. See further on the particular interest in the literature on the impact of neoliberalism on water as a specific 
resource: K. Bakker, An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatising Water in England and Wales (OUP, Oxford: 2004); K. 
Bakker, Privatising Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban Water Crisis (Cornell University Press: 2010); M. 
Finger and J. Allouche, Water Privatisation: Transnational Corporations and the Reregulation of the Water Industry (Spon 
Press, London: 2002); P. Bond, ‘Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives: Pricing and Policy Debates 
from Johannesburg to Kyoto to Cancun and Back’ (2004) 15(7) Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. 
45 P. Rodgers et al, ‘Water is an Economic Good: How to Use Prices to Promote Equity, Efficiency and Sustainability’ 
(2002) 4(1) Water Policy 1. 
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communities depending on its relative context.46 Therefore they have called for water to be given recognition 
as a human right, which places an onus upon states to provide water to all and often these calls preclude 
private sector involvement altogether.47 
 
Critique has therefore focused on three aspects of non-state actor participation:  
1) ‘Privatisation’ of municipal utilities, 
2) Growth of the bottled water industry, and 
3) Trading of water as a commodity.48 
 
It is argued that free market policies including full cost recovery and private sector participation (PSP) do not 
necessarily improve efficiency or governance.49 Commodification also often serves to price it out of reach for 
the poor.50 Hence it is often argued that PSP is even incompatible with a right to water and sanitation.54 
 
Interestingly however, within the recent emergence of this right at the international level there exists 
perhaps a more significant paradoxical phenomenon. Civil society water justice movements, who are the 
most likely of advocates, as well as many private for-profit actors, who are the most unlikely of advocates, 
are now both equally recognising this emerging right. For example, following the General Assembly 2010 
Resolution, Global Water Intelligence heralded the breakthrough as a ‘massive defeat for global water justice 
movement’ because the right ‘remained fundamentally compatible with private sector participation and 
contained no obligation on utilities to provide subsidies to poor communities.’51 On 29th June 2010, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation also published a contentious report where she 
stated that under international human rights law there ‘are no prescriptive modes of service provision.’56 
Unsurprisingly concerns from a human rights perspective are raised as to ‘whether this opened the 
floodgates to further commercialisation within the water sector.’52 As Sultana and Loftus have argued: ‘such 
concerns are real since rights discourse do not necessarily preclude marketization, privatization or 
dispossession. This in turn underscores the need to rearticulate debates with political questions around 
democracy, justice and equity.’53 
 
Concerns have also been driven by ‘soft law’ factors such as the 1992 Dublin Principles which frame water as 
an ‘economic good.’54 While these principles are non-binding in nature, their influence has arguably 
                                                          
46 See for example J. Linton, ’The Human Right to What? Water, Rights, Humans and the Relation of Things’, in Sultana 
and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 45. Linton proposes to broaden the idea of a right to water and to approach it from a 
relational perspective where it is possible to call for rights ’that involve the collective identity of human being (species 
being) and water as a process rather than quantity’, in which ’identities of humanity and water are collective, processual 
and interrelated’ at 45-46. 
47 P. Bond, Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest (Merlin Press, London: 2002). 
48 Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 2-3. 
49 E. Gutierrez et al., New Rules, New Roles: Does PSP benefit the poor? – Synthesis Report (Wateraid and Tearfund, 
London: 2003). 
50 Ibid. See also, E. Harvey, ’The Commodification of Water in Soweto and its Implications for Social Justice’ (2007) Thesis 
submitted for doctor of philosophy, Sociology Department, School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 
51 Global Water Intelligence, ’The Human Right to a National Water Plan’ (2010) available at: 
www.globalwaterintel.com/insight/human-right-national-water-plan.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). The 
World Bank and other bodies such as the World Water Council have also officially accepted the right. 
52 Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 2. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, 31 January 1992. Adopted at the International 
Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland, available at: www.un-documents.net/h2o-dub.htm (last 
accessed: 5 September 2018). 
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encouraged further private sector involvement where market factors such as full cost recovery are 
propagated. As Sultana and Loftus further contend, this has led to increased marginalisation and exclusion 
of vulnerable groups and communities. Furthermore, these trends have resulted in a situation where ‘those 
who can afford have it readily, those who can’t left without affordable or accessible water sources.’55 From 
this perspective, corporate interests are thereby the most unlikely yet most vocal supporters of the right as 
a means for greater expansion of business opportunities, in this case ‘the struggle to achieve fair access to 
water is in danger of producing its own nemesis.’56 Sultana and Loftus cite important issues such as the 
politics of water governance, equality and water justice which may be affected if this right is to be driven by 
individualisation and a liberal capitalistic approach which is negligent and dismissive of the socio-economic 
injustices caused by power asymmetries.57 
 
Therefore, despite the considerable degree of consensus and the ‘moral weight’ of the right to water, Sultana 
and Loftus submit that the right ‘risks becoming an empty signifier a shallow post-political consensus that 
actually does little to effect real change in water governance.’58 Herein, ‘rights discourse may subvert water 
equity if efficiency and full-cost recovery are prioritised.’59 This emerging right may thus ‘obfuscate as much 
as it clarifies sometimes furthering the very agendas water activists seek to counter.’60 
 
In light of this argument, the right to water and sanitation ‘says little as to how and who will be providing 
it.’67 Clark goes on to argue that organisations have ‘sought to reduce the content of the right to water to the 
question of access’ (emphasis added).61 In other words, there is no guarantee of fair implementation, 
accountability or that co-optation is prevented. 
 
Indeed, it is submitted here that these concerns necessarily raise the issue of legitimacy and accountability – 
particularly in the absence of binding international legal obligations on non-state actors.62 There remains a 
continued search, domestically and internationally, as how best to hold non-state actors accountable for acts 
or omissions which may impede the progressive realisation of this right, and possibly, incur upon them direct 
human rights duties and obligations. In this vein, Moyo and Liebenberg account for a ‘range of non-binding 
state-initiated mechanisms both within and without the UN system that have since been attempted to 
impose human rights obligations on non-state actors.’63 
 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 3. See also, C. de Alburquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related 
to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, 29 June 2010, available at: 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/iexpert/docs/A-HRC-15-31-AEV.pdf (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
57 Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 3-13. 
58 Ibid, 4. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 C. Clark, ’The Centrality of Community Participation to the Realisation of the Right to Water: The Illustrative Case of 
South Africa’, in Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 179. 
62 See P. Alston, ’The Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accomodate Non-state Actors?’, 
in P. Alston (ed.), Non-state Actors and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford: 2005), 3-36. 
63 Moyo and Liebenberg, Privitization of Water Services (n.38) 708. Key initiatives outlined, which lie beyond the scope 
of this paper include: the 2008 Report adopted by the Human Rights Council, UN Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework 
for Business and Human Rights (UN Framework); 2011 UN Guiding Principles to operationalise this Framework; 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines; 
International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy; UN Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights (Norms on TNCs) and the UN’s Global Compact. 
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However in doing so, as Bakker has pointed out, there has been a disproportionate focus on dualisms and 
substantive rights only, predominately accessibility, affordability, quantity and financial sustainability.64 It is 
submitted that there is a need for recognition that many misconceptions arise when advocates evoke a right 
to water and sanitation that solely focuses upon opposing ‘privatisation.’65 
 
The first is that from a pragmatic perspective examples of ‘purely’ non-state actor service provision are still 
in the minority. In the majority of cases, as alluded to above, hybrid models comprising of both state and 
non-state actor service provision is preferred.66 Further, Castree for example notes from his case analyses 
that different types of processes are often grouped under the ‘nebulous banner of neoliberalism’ i.e. 
privatisation, marketization, deregulation, re-regulation, commercialisation, corporatisation all of which take 
differentiated economic forms.67 Bakker further contends that there are three strategic errors in anti-
privatisation campaigns, namely a conflation of human rights and property rights; failing to distinguish 
between different types of property rights and service delivery models and thereby failing to foreclose the 
possibility of increasing private sector involvement in water supply.68 She provides a valuable clarification of 
the different forms of resource management and their respective typologies as well as the different delivery 
models of state, market and community.69 
 
Secondly, states remain the primary legal duty-bearers under international law, even where non-state actors 
are involved. As the Special Rapporteur affirms, ‘the state cannot exempt itself from its human rights 
obligations by involving non-state actors – the state remains the primary duty-bearer for the realisation of 
human rights.’70 For example, the 2008 UN framework for application of human rights standards to non-state 
actors sets out differentiated but complementary responsibilities, underscored by the tripartite principles of 
the primary State duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as well as to provide 
access to remedies.71 Given the abovementioned structural realities, inadequate state-actor accountability 
in this field also prevails. It is put forth here that this is with regard to the difficulties in both vertical and 
horizontal justiciable recognition of socio-economic rights generally,72 and not primarily because a right to 
water remains politically contested. 
 
As outlined above, another layer of complexity in this field is a type of ‘elite capture’ of the right, which does 
not on its own preclude privatisation. This is exacerbated by the excessive focus placed on duty-bearers which 
has centred the debate on reductionist issues of substantive rights rather than on legal rights-holders and 
how they, as individuals and as communities, may participate with full agency in shaping the normative 
content of this emerging right. Indeed, emerging counter-trends such the ‘commons’, water as a ‘public trust’ 
and ‘alter-globalisation’ movements point to this problem (see section 2 infra). Renewed aims therefore 
                                                          
64 Bakker, ’Commons versus the Community’ (n.36) 28-29. 
65 Ibid. 
66 UN Special Rapporteur (n.56) 4-13. 
67 N. Castree, ‘The Epistemology of Particulars: Human Geography, Case Studies and “Context”’ (2005) 36(5) Geoforum 
541. 
68 Bakker, ’Commons versus the Community’ (n.36) 28. 
69 Ibid, 32 and 34. 
70 UN Special Rapporteur (n.56) 18. 
71 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69, 1(a), UN Doc. XVII, 
E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (2005). As highlighted, there remains a strong current of critique and a quest to bring in non-
state actors as duty-bearers under international law. 
72 See for example Nolan, ’Holding Non-state Actors to Account’ (n.7). 
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include broader issues such as greater accountability including transparency, monitoring and regulation, as 
well as the sanctity of water to both human societies and the natural environment.73 
 
2. Re-Thinking Normative Content Through Strengthening Procedural Elements of Community 
Participatory Rights and Strategic Public Interest Litigation 
 
It is evident that more forward-looking questions as to how and why certain modalities are followed, their 
outcomes and impacts on local communities are now occurring within a growing recognition of the disabling 
dualism of the public/private binary. There is a shift of focus towards ‘public stewardship,’ water as a 
‘commons’ and ‘alternatives for provision’ that are community-interest orientated.74 In part, this means that 
there is a need to equally recognise that the political and legal frontlines of this debate are shifting towards 
re-articulation of priorities and principles, equitable distribution and deep democracy.75 In the formulation 
and struggle for this precision within human rights discourse, in what way then, can we re-think a right that 
effectuates useful progress for vulnerable communities where ‘vulnerable’ is understood as being 
contextually relative? For example, this may be poorer and rural communities in South Africa that lack access 
adequate water and sanitation provision, and those who are disconnected as a result of the inability to pay 
tariff increases (infra Part C). It may also be communities in developed countries such as Ireland, which may 
be affected by regressive measures taken under an austerity panacea and increased divesture in water 
services76 (infra Part D). 
 
From the perspective of the commons, water contains non-substitutable unique qualities84 – it is a flow 
resource that is indispensable to life (indeed it is second only to oxygen in terms of immediate survival needs), 
and is in fact life itself – human beings are essentially water bodies made up of more than 70% of this element. 
Water is also indispensable for ecosystem health; therefore it is ‘tightly bound to communities and 
ecosystems through the hydrological cycle’ necessitating as Shiva has argued, ‘collective management of 
water resources.’77 Bakker has further outlined three core arguments within this framework: 1) water supply 
which is subject to multiple market and state failures, without community involvement will not manage water 
wisely; 2) water has important cultural and spiritual dimensions closely articulated with place-based 
practices, as such provision cannot be left to private companies or to the state; and 3) water is a local flow 
resource whose use and health are most deeply impacted at a community level. Therefore, protection of 
ecological and public health will only occur if communities are mobilised and enabled to govern their own 
resources. Conservation is also more incentivised through an environmental, collectivist ethic of solidarity, 
which encourages users from engaging in wasteful behaviour.86 Through this lens, the ‘real water crisis’ 
(emphasis added) is then in fact a ‘socially produced scarcity, in which a short term logic of economic growth’ 
                                                          
73 V. Shiva, Earth Democracy (Zed Books, London: 2005). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Sultana and Loftus, Right to Water (n.19) 7. 
76 See C. de Alburquerque, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, 
(11 July 2013), UN Doc. A/HRC/24/44 available at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Documents/A-HRC-24-44_en.pdf (last accessed: 5 
September 2018). See also, McIntyre, ’Human Right to Water’ (n.3). As McIntyre points out, ’the link between fiscal 
austerity and states’ commitments to ESCR was recognised recently by civil society organisations in the Vienna+20 CSO 
Declaration, adopted 26 June 2013 which acknowledges, at 6, para.19, that ’deep and farreaching austerity measures 
in many parts of the world … coupled with long-standing financial regulation failures in the North, have deepened 
economic inequalities within and between countries, with inter-generational impacts on the realisation of the human 
right to decent work, adequate standard of living for all, social protection, food, housing, water, health and education 
among others’ [emphasis added] 74-75. 
77 See, V. Shiva, Water Wars (South End Press, London: 2002). 
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has in so doing ‘converted abundance into scarcity.’78 Thus for example, in response to the Dublin Principles, 
the P7 Declaration 2000 outlined principles of water democracy, decentralised, community-based 
democratic water management, where water conservation is politically, socially, economically, culturally 
inspired rather than economically motivated.79 
 
Bakker has therefore concluded that genuine community alternatives must contain two elements. The first 
is the reformation rather than abolishment state governance’ whilst secondly and simultaneously ’fostering 
and sharing alternative local models of resource management.’80 Moreover, ‘no one model can be 
anticipated or imposed,’ rather they ‘build on local resource management and community norms.’81 Indeed, 
Clark notes that water has been collectively managed by many societies throughout history.82 For example, 
in Roman law: aqua profluens (flowing water) was classified as res communes (belonging to everyone, equity, 
society wide ownership etc.)92 It also continues in many systems of indigenous water rights today, where 
participation is fostered in community water governance processes – for example in the Chilean Andes.83 
Reality, according to Clark, undermines the contention put forth by Garrett Hardin’s (1968) ‘The Tragedy of 
the Commons’ where she rebuts his view that the commons will inevitably entail decentivisation and 
depletion by arguing that he ‘fails to take into account the historical success of community management’ 
where many cases are subject to ’well-defined rules of access and use.’84 According to the UN Development 
Programme for example, ‘customary law often involves strict controls on water use with water rights 
structured to balance claims based on inheritance, social need and sustainability, institutional cooperation is 
common.’95 In order to support her hypothesis, she refers to various case examples such as a large-scale 
study on irrigation systems where it was shown that ‘participatory community management is the superior 
institutional framework in terms of ensuring both efficient and equitable water allocations.’85 She cites 
similar findings in rural water supply projects, forest management, where community involvement that 
increases local ownership results in greater willingness to contribute to and concern for resource 
preservation.86 Osmani further illustrates how cooperation at the community level often outperforms 
alternative models such as central governance management or market control in terms of both efficiency 
and equity.87 
 
Community participation cannot however occur in a legal vacuum. An interlinking procedural element from 
a human rights praxis perspective is that of public interest litigation (PIL). Therefore, it is submitted that 
maximising community participatory rights in this way can be utilised to effectively articulate strategic public 
interest advocacy and litigation in order to enhance administrative justice to better hold service providers to 
account for violations of the right to water and sanitation. 
 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, 31-33. 
80 Ibid, 33-38. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 180. 
83 Ibid. See also, R. Boelens and H.D. Vos, ’Water Law and Indigenous Rights in the Andes’ (2006) 29(4) Cultural Survival 
Quarterly 18. 
84 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 181-182. See also, United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report – Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, (UNDP, New York: 2006) 16-
17. 
85 Ibid. 
86 S. Osmani, ’Participatory Governance: An Overview of Issues and Evidence’, in United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UNDESA) (ed), Participatory Governance and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), (United 
Nations, New York: 2008) 15-18. 
87 Ibid. 
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In short, PIL is the use of the judicial court system through adversarial litigation which seeks to advance the 
cause of a minority or disadvantaged groups or individuals, or which raises issues of broad public concern.88 
In other words, it strategically employs the law to effect social change. As outlined by Surya, PIL has ‘a vital 
role in the civil justice system in that it could achieve those objectives which could hardly be achieved through 
conventional private litigation.’89 It therefore, ‘offers a ladder to justice to disadvantaged sections of society, 
provides an avenue to enforce diffused or collective rights, and enables civil society to not only spread 
awareness about human rights but also allows them to participate in government decision-making.’101 
Crucially, it also contributes to ‘good governance by keeping the government accountable.’102 This is 
especially the case in light of structural asymmetries in this field, as outlined above; not all rights-holders 
have equal access to their rights, nor the capacity or resources to challenge abuses of such rights before their 
judicial systems. 
 
Therefore, it is plainly evident that PIL contains inherent limitations that advocacy networks ought to be 
aware of. To highlight this, the next section of this paper will analyse the Mazibuko case as an example of the 
need for prioritising procedural rights of participation and effective litigation strategies within the right to 
water and sanitation. In summary, this section has attempted to put forward a contextual theoretical 
framework for re-thinking the normative content of the right to water and sanitation. Within this conceptual 
understanding, what lessons and possibilities does the South African example then hold? And in turn what 
possibilities can be drawn for a more meaningful content if Ireland were to recognise such a right in the 
future? 
 
 
C. SOUTH AFRICA – THE MAZIBUKO JUDGMENT AND THE RIGHT TO WATER AND 
SANITATION, AN EMPTY SIGNIFIER? 
 
1. The Right to Water and Sanitation under South African Legal and Policy Framework: 
Experiences and Lessons from the Mazibuko Public Interest Litigation Case 
 
It must be emphasised from the onset that an analysis of the South African case in this context is not new.90 
The Constitutional Court’s ruling nearly a decade ago has attracted much attention in the discourse due to 
its particular implications for what has otherwise been thought of as a leading domestic example of ‘good 
practice’ regarding  an explicit right to water and sanitation.91 Clark for example maintains that it ‘highlights 
the risk that the right to water will largely be hollow if its content is reduced to access and fails to incorporate 
community participation.’92 Similarly, Bond proffers that the case provides ’the basis for rethinking both 
rights and commons so that both the ecological and community control factors are foregrounded, alongside 
contestation of the deeper logic of capital accumulation that explains the drive for commodification within 
which activists campaign for water rights.’93 Dunchin also points out that it is thus far ’the most recent 
                                                          
88 The PILSNI Project: Advancing human rights and equality through public interest litigation, available at: 
www.pilsni.org/about-public-interest-litigation (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
89 D. Surya, ’Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review’ (2009) 1 Civil Justice Quarterly 19. 
90 See for example, Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61). See also, P. Bond, ’The Right to the City and the 
Eco-social Commoning of Water – Discursive and Political Lessons from South Africa’, in Sultana and Loftus, Right to 
Water (n.19) 190. 
91 Sultana and Loftus have also cautioned that ’good practice’ is the new dialogue that needs to be taken with a pinch 
of salt. This means increased awareness of the problems of implementing plans and policies. See, Sultana and Loftus, 
ibid. 
92 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 175. 
93 Bond, Unsustainable South Africa (n.47) 191. 
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precedent in South Africa’s closely watched economic and social rights jurisprudence following in the wake 
of such decisions as Soobramoney (1998), Grootboom (2001), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002), 
Modderklip (2005) and Olivia Road (2008).’ 94 He also points to how it sheds ’critical light on the debate over 
whether economic and social rights have minimum legal content or a “minimum core” as posited by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its 1990 General Comment No.3 on the Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations.’95 Thirdly, it provides a ‘useful case study of both the potential and limits of strategic 
public interest litigation and the justiciability and enforcement of economic and social rights in the national 
sphere.’109 
 
Unlike the Irish context (infra Part D), the South African Constitution96 enshrines a broad range of justiciable 
socio-economic rights under its extensive Bill of Rights.97 Given the historical injustices suffered under 
Apartheid rule, Section 7.1 firmly states that these rights form the ‘cornerstone of democracy.’ Section 7.2 
further provides that the state is obliged to ‘respect, promote, protect and fulfil’ the rights contained therein. 
However, Section 7.3 does subject these rights to a limitation clause contained under Section 36, ‘in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.’98 Section 27 provides for the right to 
healthcare, food, water and social security (emphasis added). Section 27.2 further obliges the state to take 
‘reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of these rights.’ In terms of justiciability of socio-economic rights, the Constitutional Court has 
also been viewed as an example of good practice and has played a role in international human rights law 
articulation.99 Therefore, an analysis of this seminal court ruling is both valuable and useful in terms of re-
evaluating priorities and principles of an international human right’s approach to water and sanitation. It may 
also act as a guiding reminder of the importance of including robust procedural rights in other jurisdictions, 
such as Ireland, where communities are increasingly calling for a right to water to be explicitly recognised 
within their respective legal systems. 
 
Turing to the substantive matter of the case itself, it centred upon two legal issues:100 1) the installation of 
pre-paid water meters by the local municipality in the Phiri informal settlement of the district of Soweto in 
Johannesburg, and 2) the adequacy of the government’s free basic water allocation policy of 25 litres per 
person per day. Clark observes that this was the Court’s ‘first opportunity to define the scope of the right 
under Section 27.’101 Indeed, Bond goes further and maintains that this ‘was the most important test so far 
of possibly the world’s most advanced water rights Constitutional clause.’102 The group of local residents 
                                                          
94 P. Dunchin, ’A Human Right to Water? The South African Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Mazibuko Case’, (13 
January 2010), EJIL Talk, European Journal of International Law, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-
the-south-african-constitutional-court%E2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/ (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 10 December 1996, available at: 
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5de4.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
97 Ibid Chapter 2, Bill of Rights. See further, Nolan, ’Holding Non-state Actors to Account’ (n.7). 
98 In limiting these rights the following (non-exhaustive) relevant factors are to be taken into account: (a) the nature of 
the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
99 For example, the incorporation of ’reasonable’ into the text of Article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is a 
direct reference to the more limited form of judicial review adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in its 
seminal socio-economic rights case, Grootboom. Reasonableness was favoured by the working group and thus 
incorporated into the text of OP. See Clark generally (n.61). 
100 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 176. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Bond, Unsustainable South Africa (n.47) 190. 
CCJHR Working Paper Series No.9               [2018] 
University College Cork      15 
backed by wider public interest advocacy networks had previously succeeded in their objections to both of 
these policy measures in two lower-court rulings. Applicants argued for interpretation of clear content which 
focused on minimum quantities, the recognition of need for affordability as well as, significantly, 
participatory elements that included ‘the need for procedural justice and community participation in the 
development and implementation of water policies.’103 
 
The Applicants argued that the City’s policy of delivering water on a pre-payment basis (Operation 
Gcin’amanzi – conserve water) in certain low-income poverty-stricken areas was unconstitutional and 
discriminatory, based on Section 27 as well as certain anti-discriminatory provisions under the Water Services 
Act 1997 and Johannesburg by-laws.104 In terms of quantity, the Soweto applicants argued for 50 litres p/p/d 
whereas the City insisted on its policy floor of 25 litres. Section 1 of the Water Services Act operationalises 
Section 27.1(b). Basic water supply is defined therein as ‘the prescribed minimum standard of water supply 
services necessary for the reliable supply of sufficient quantity and quality of water of households, including 
informal households, to support life and personal hygiene.’105 
 
Yet despite these strong constitutional and legislative guarantees, the majority judgment delivered by Justice 
O’Regan instead ‘reflected a narrow interpretation’106 of the law. Clark puts forth that it ‘not only accepted 
the dominance of market-based solutions but also minimised the role of community participation.’107 This in 
turn, ‘threatens to make the right to water effectively meaningless for poor and marginalized communities 
in South Africa and potentially elsewhere.’108 
 
(a) Public Participation and Administrative Justice Claim 
 
The Applicants claimed that they had ‘insufficient opportunity to participate in policy development and were 
not adequately consulted about its implementation.’123 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides for ‘Just administrative action’109 as follows: 
Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
 
Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be 
given written reasons. 
 
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must— (a) provide for the 
review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial 
tribunal;  
 
Imposes a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and to promote an 
efficient administrative action. 
 
                                                          
103 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 176. 
104 See Water Services Act No 108 of 1997. 
105 Ibid Section 1. 
106 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 191. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid.  
109 See, South African Constitution (n.96) section 33. 
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All actions that affect the public must be preceded by public participation and this has been given legislative 
effect in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000.110 Section 4(1) provides that: ‘any administrative 
action (that) materially and adversely affects the rights of the public must be proceeded by a public inquiry 
or a notice and comment procedure. It is only permissible to depart if it is reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances.’ Further, the Municipal Systems Act 2000 Section 4(2)(e) requires: ‘local councils to consult 
with communities about the level, quality, range and impact of municipal services and the available options 
for service delivery.’111 
 
However, the Court went on to dismiss these administrative and procedural justice arguments. The Court’s 
rationale was that the decision to impose pre-paid meters resulted in an executive as opposed to an 
administrative action decision and was therefore exempt from meeting compliance requirements under 
PAJA. Liebenberg has criticised this interpretation as being an ‘overly broad construction of the executive 
powers of a municipal council.’112 The implication unjustly reduces the ‘scope for public participation in 
decisions which affect enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights.’113 The installation 
of pre-paid meters is a ’policy formulation in a narrow rather than broad sense’ and therefore ’constitutes 
exercise of administrative rather than executive power.’114 Clark maintains that this interpretation makes 
sense given that ‘the purpose of Section 33 and PAJA is to make government action more transparent and 
accountable.’115 In its classification therefore, Court ‘is effectively drawing a curtain around significant areas 
of public policy.’116 
 
(b) Separation of Decision-Making Processes and Implementation 
 
The Court’s reasoning also distinguished between the decision to introduce pre-paid meters and the process 
of implementation itself.117 Implementation was held to be ‘procedurally fair as community workers were 
employed to explain the process to the community’ and public meetings were held thereto. But Clark notes 
that this finding contrasts with the earlier High Court ruling which described the consultative process as a 
‘publicity drive’ for a policy decision that was already a fait accompli, finding the approach to be misleading, 
intimidatory and presumptive.118 In effect, the Constitutional Court’s legal separation allowed it ‘to consider 
the community participatory role without examining their power (or lack thereof) to affect the outcome of 
the process.’119 Clark’s critique aptly draws on Arnstein’s ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation,’ where she 
identifies eight levels of participation ranging from non-participation, tokenism and actual citizen power: 
here, ‘there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the 
real power needed to affect the outcome of the process.’120 It is submitted here that not only is such a process 
tokenistic (whilst conceding that access to information is a valid procedural element in itself), merely being 
informed in a “consultation setting” of a fait accompli as was the City’s approach, is not participatory in any 
                                                          
110 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 (hereinafter PAJA). 
111 Municipal Systems Act 2000. 
112 S. Liebenberg, Socio-economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Juta Academic, Cape Town: 
2010), Postscript. See further, Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 177. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 177. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. See, S v Mazibuko (A1246/2006) (2008) 2AGPHC 106 (18 April 2008) available at: 
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.html (last accessed: 5 September 2018). 
119 Ibid.  
120 S.R. Arnstein, ’A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) 35(4) Journal of the American Planning Association 216. 
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sense at all. The approach is static, regressive, removes the crucial analyses of power asymmetries and 
seriously undermines the integrity of the term. 
 
(c) Contestation of the Operation of Pre-Paid Meters and a Denial of Procedural Safeguards 
 
In terms of objections to water disconnections, the Applicants relied on Section 4(3) of the Water Services 
Act which provides that any disconnection or limitation of a water service must comply with a range of 
procedural safeguards, including provision of reasonable notice, and the opportunity to make 
representations to ensure people are not denied access to basic water services for their inability to pay.121 
The Applicants contended that when a pre-paid meter disconnects a water service for non-payment there is 
no notice nor any opportunity to make such representations. Families, living in poverty-stricken informal 
settlements with up to eight people per household (many including vulnerable groups such as children and 
the elderly), are forced to go without water until they are able to afford new credit or a new month’s free 
basic water allowance becomes available.122 Uncontested evidence pointed to the fact that most Applicants 
went without water for up to 15 days.123 Despite this evidence the Court ruled the legislation to be 
inapplicable in these circumstances because it was ‘administratively impossible for pre-paid meters system 
to comply with its requirements.’141 But as Clark maintains, this would actually reinforce the Applicant’s claim 
that they are an unlawful device,124 precisely because they are irreconcilable with procedural fairness as set 
out in the statute. 
 
The Court further distinguished between the terms ‘suspended’ and ‘disconnected’125 to dismiss the 
Applicant’s claim that they constituted disconnections – because water was available to residents in the next 
month the term ‘suspension’ only applied. Clark sensibly argues that this finding ‘disregards the very real 
benefits afforded by procedural safeguards.’126 Such safeguards play a crucial role in preventing water from 
being disconnected in the first place. They also allow communication to ensure government service providers 
(in this instance) are ‘not insulated from knowledge that tariffs are set at unaffordable rate for many.’ 
 
Moreover, the Court’s distinction disregards the impacts on health and dignity of having to ‘endure regular 
denial of water services due to lack of credit.’ In the English case of R v Director General of Water Services,127 
which Clark utilises to substantiate her criticism, a similar issue was considered eleven years prior to 
Mazibuko in South Africa. Therein, Justice Harrison found the use of pre-paid meters to be illegal – it was 
‘common sense that meters disconnected or otherwise cut off the supply of water to the premises,’ and that 
this impacted on vulnerable people and low-income households which carried with it a negative impact on 
public health.128 Hence Clark effectively points to the ‘harsh irony that the opposite conclusion could be 
reached eleven years later in South Africa, a country widely viewed as a leader in social rights jurisprudence. 
 
The Constitutional Court is the final arbiter of the law in South Africa. Given its ruling, what lessons does this 
judgment hold for the future re-thinking of the right to water and sanitation from a procedural advocacy 
perspective? 
 
                                                          
121 See Water Services Act (n.104) section 4(3). 
122 Clark, ’Centrality of Community Participation’ (n.61) 178. 
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(d) An Empty Signifier? 
 
Bond maintains that a costs-benefits analysis of this case requires ‘full and frank debate.’129 He points to the 
shortcomings in Clark’s review; that whilst there is indeed needed to include the complementary right to 
participation, this forms but one lesson. ‘Unless capable of breaking beyond the bounds of neoliberal public 
policy, it is one acceptable to many water privatisers and other neoliberal advocates of a smaller state.’130 
Bakker in advancing a commons view, as previously mentioned, also points out the limitations of ‘rights talk’ 
and the possibilities of co-optation. Moreover, Bond contends that putting such public policy power in the 
hands of very often conservative judges ‘may be inappropriate.’131 This is due to the reluctance of the Court 
to involve itself in the setting of prescriptive levels of water provision. Indeed, this deferential position can 
be clearly seen in the Irish context of socio-economic rights justiciability (infra Part D). 
 
Therefore Bond aptly describes a ‘huge paradox’ that in exists in terms of political concerns, wherein 
communities are ‘often forced to appeal to the very states who have failed to provide them with water.’132 
In his argument Bond proffers that the ‘full set of hydropolitical connections between the social and 
ecological is not properly conceptualised in water rights framing’ and makes the case for the politics of water 
rights which is better contextualised from a Marxist ‘right to the city’ standpoint. This point of view will not 
be addressed in detail as it lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, suffice to say, Bond outlines other 
key limitations in the Mazibuko case that may be useful for the purpose of this discussion. In terms of 
strategic litigation the case is criticised on several grounds.133 
 
Firstly, it was obstructively individualist in that it remained private and familial instead of public and political. 
Secondly, it was also consumption-orientated (without links to production and ecology etc.). Moreover, it 
was framed not to resist but to legitimise neoliberalism. It was also unable to transcend society class 
structures – this distracted activists from potentially more serious strategies to dismantle class divisions 
through redistribution and/or reparations. It ultimately also proved too technicist, thus alienating the mass 
base and society in general. In doing so it was guilty of making mass based organisations the ‘client’ which in 
the process became ‘domesticated’ – for example social protests were told to stop during litigation. It then 
became subjected to the watering down of rights given the Constitutional clauses of progressive realisation, 
reasonable measures within available resources. It was also ‘tempting for scholars to follow its legal 
alleyways,’ this in turn distracted from more transformative route to politics. And given that judges are 
amongst the ‘most conservative elites’ in society it proved precarious in class-power terms. Moreover, it was 
reflective of ‘an overall problem that even liberal-democratic capitalism will not deliver basic-needs goods to 
poor people.’134 Lastly, there was a mistake as to the request for relief which was too narrow, partially based 
on the grounds of international evidence for minimal water quantity needs. As Danchin points out, whilst 
international law is persuasive, what takes precedence is the Constitutional Court’s own development of its 
‘flexible reasonableness doctrine in an effort to forge a distinctly South African attitude to the justiciability 
of economic and social rights.’135 
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However Bond appropriately highlights the comments of one of the key advocates on the case, Jackie Dugard 
who maintains that the ‘reasonableness’ test ‘ignored the realpolitik of Soweto.’136 According to Dugard, the 
Court misunderstood the Applicants as arguing for minimum core approach to the right to water. They had 
in fact ‘pursued the Grootboom approach (in rejection of minimum core approach as being too inflexible), 
which is that rights and obligations can only be established in context.’137 Applicants specifically asked the 
Court to evaluate the City’s water policy ‘in the context of a high-density urban township with waterborne 
sanitation and no alternative water or sanitation sources.’138 The Court nonetheless displayed an 
extraordinary degree of deference in finding that this policy fell within the remit of ‘reasonableness’ which 
shows a worrying retreat from earlier-praised adjudication. 
 
Bond states that a possible rebuttal may be that the Applicants ‘did not stress strongly enough the extent to 
which wealthy white residents has access to plentiful, inexpensive water on credit (not pre-paid), for 
comparative water consumption across race and class was not a major part of the case, as the effort to win 
a victory meant narrowing the narrative to a relatively non-contextualised terrain.’139 
 
Yet Dugard has pointed to areas where the Court was both class and race-biased in which the City’s policy, 
viewed as ‘textually permissible,’ results in a ‘new form of highly deferent legal interpretation.’140 
Astoundingly, the Court dismissed the unfair discrimination (based on race) ground ‘because despite proven 
debt across City, pre-payment meters have only installed in poor black areas – the Court said that the 
applicants had not proven that pre-payment meters were installed in ALL black areas.’ Dugard appropriately 
discharges this reasoning in the following terms: ‘This is nonsensical and goes against all its previous equality 
decisions. It would mean that for example if I allege dismissal on grounds of sexual orientation (a listed 
ground in the Constitution) amounted to unfair discrimination, I would have to prove that my employer 
dismissed ALL other gay employees in the organisation.’141 Therefore, the ‘legal-technicist’ arguments of 
Court ‘were thus subtly political, in defense of the status quo.’ The Mazibuko case also shows a disconcerting 
retreat from enforceable socio-economic rights.162 What implications therefore, can this example have for a 
future potential Irish context? 
 
 
D. IRELAND – A CASE STUDY: PUBLIC ADVOCACY AND CALLS FOR A RIGHT TO WATER 
AND SANITATION, AN EMERGING PROSPECT? 
 
1. Public (Community) Advocacy and Water Charges Under the Austerity Restructuring of the 
Irish Water Services Sector 
 
The civil society movement against the semi-state company Irish Water, the austerity-backed water charges 
and the recent calls for a recognition of a right to water and sanitation is amongst one of the biggest and 
most rapidly expanding public advocacy campaigns in Irish history. 
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Before assessing the legal position and possibilities from the aforementioned South African case, it is useful 
to briefly outline the recent attempts at restructuring the Irish water sector.142 
 
Following the 2008 recession, Ireland’s financial bail-out and its terms thereon was set out under the 2009 
EU/IMF Memorandum of Understanding.143 This agreement, inter alia, required the restructuring of the 
water services sector which also included a tabled plan for the introduction of domestic water charges (2012-
2013) 144 under the auspices of fiscal austerity. 
 
Additionally, McIntyre notes that it was ’quite clear that Irish water-related infrastructure and services 
urgently’ required ‘considerable improvement’ by means of capital investment.166 A 2011 Environmental 
Protection Agency report145 indeed does outline the need for investment in order to ‘meet the water quality 
requirements’146 under the European Union’s Water Framework Directive (2015).147 Conaghan has pointed 
out that at the time government costs of providing water services reached €1.2billion in 2010, operational 
costs €715million and capital costs €500million.148 McIntyre also notes that there was an affirmative 
commitment to ‘transition to a non-exchequer based funding model by the start of 2014.’149 At the time, 
public health risks included contamination by cryptosporidium and the system was (and still is despite the 
recent transition to Irish Water infra) considered ‘wasteful, with average water leakage levels estimated at 
41%.’ Hence, a Programme for Government was implemented which included the pledge to install water 
meters within a charging system. This was preconditioned by the establishment of a new State utility 
company Irish Water. It was established as a semi-state utility which means it maintained (until recently) the 
statutory mandate of installing water meters, billing ‘customers’ including operational functions such as 
sourcing investments and other private finance.150 
 
Irish Water was planned to take over management of 34 local water service authorities.151 However, given 
unexpected mass public opposition to water charges, this processual transition has been mired by setbacks 
and controversy.152 The company is incorporated under the Water Services Act 2013 and centralises 31 local 
authorities (water and wastewater services) under this one semi-state service provider.153 In terms of 
regulatory structures in place, it falls within the regulatory and monitoring oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Its economic regulation is overseen by the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER), which 
is mandated with ‘protecting the interests of the customer, while approving an appropriate funding 
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requirement sufficient to enable the utility to deliver the required services to specified standards in an 
efficient manner.’177 It was also to regulate the setting of tariffs. 
 
The MOU itself however does not require privatisation. However, this should not of course be construed as 
meaning that privatisation is implausible. Nevertheless, The Water Services Act 2007 (as amended) further 
provides for ‘three levels of safeguards to ensure democratic control over the sector,’ set out as follows:154 
 
Section 27: The Minister may only transfer functions to private operator if democratic accountability 
for the function is ensured. McIntyre179 points out that there ‘does not appear to be any equivalent 
for state-owned company.’ Of course this raises concerns of a possible accountability deficit when it 
comes to holding the state actor to account. 
 
Section 31(2): water services authority cannot contract with private operators where this would 
involve the transfer of the authority’s assets or infrastructure to that private sector. 
 
Section 40(7): a water service provider authority which contracts services out to the private sector 
will continue to be responsible for the compliance of those services with the requirements of this 
Act. 
 
McIntyre concedes that there is ‘likelihood of private entities acquiring some form of interest’ given that one 
of the purposes of the company’s establishment was that ‘borrowing capacity is higher than other models 
allowing the entity to become self-funding sooner.’155 Further, ‘privatisation of the water utility might 
become attractive in the future.’181 From a human rights perspective, taking account of financial bail-outs 
and the austerity panacea to economic instability, many issues arise as to the precise implications and 
possible regressive measures that may result from such policies. These are further exacerbated by the 
particularly human rights sensitive nature and aforementioned socio-environmental (and cultural) 
characteristics of water and what this resource means to communities. Indeed, the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
report on 11th July 2013 addresses the links between fiscal austerity and states’ commitments to socio-
economic rights realisation.156 She discusses the precarious risks posed to these rights during financial crises. 
Whilst non-binding, The Vienna+20 CSO Declaration (25-26 June 2013) also highlights this important issue, 
providing for guiding principles and the reaffirms the primacy of human rights as well as the urgent need to 
ensure legal accountability for human rights abuses. With possibly significant resonance to the Irish context, 
it acknowledges that: 
 
Deep and far-reaching austerity measures in many parts of the world … coupled with longstanding 
financial regulation failures in the North, have deepened economic inequalities between countries, 
with inter-generational impacts on the realisation of the human rights to decent work, an adequate 
standard of living for all, social protection, food, housing, water, health and education, amongst 
others (emphasis added).157 
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Since 2013, there have been rallying calls for a legally recognised Irish right to water and sanitation in the 
wake of the suspension of water charges which occurred as a direct result of social protests and mass political 
advocacy networks (nearly 100,000 people protested the water charges during the course of 2014).158 It is 
therefore clear that these concerns are supported by a large percentage of the Irish population. However, it 
is submitted that solely opposing charges is insufficient even precluding PSP; without robust procedural rights 
elements of community participation in the decision-making and management of this resource including 
open legal avenues for advancing strategic public interest litigation (if need be), a right to water risks 
becoming an empty signifier in a shallow post-political consensus. Indeed, much can be learnt from the 
position of the South African Mazibuko case as outlined above as well as the Irish judicial position with regard 
to socio-economic rights adjudication. 
 
2. The Irish Legal framework: Defining a Right to Water and Sanitation? Challenges and 
Possibilities for Meaningful Content 
 
Currently, there is no constitutional or legislative explicit right to water and sanitation in Ireland.159 The 
government has however ratified the ICESCR which, as outlined in Part B, is the core international legal 
instrument for deriving a right to water and sanitation, (notwithstanding some objections). It is submitted 
that as a foundational measure, it would serve advocacy networks to push for the government to commit to 
its intention and sign up to the Covenant’s Optional Protocol which provides for an individual complaints 
mechanism procedure in order to bring claims of human rights violations against state parties. 
 
Importantly, as mentioned at the start of this paper, Ireland did not support the UNGA Resolution recognising 
an international human right to water and sanitation. However, it is submitted that given the recent public 
opposition to water charges, this arguably highlights a gulf or disconnect that exists between classes within 
Irish society wrought by recession which has impacted the middle to lower-income brackets including the 
most vulnerable. Further, there is a growing disjuncture between the general public and political 
representatives who continue to carry the weight of EU/IMF austerity on their shoulders, despite such social 
struggles to the contrary. The official reasoning as McIntyre points out was ‘related to cost implications’186 – 
however nebulous the objection may be. Nevertheless, given such rapid attitudinal changes in this post-
recession decade, Ireland may well recognise such a right despite its abstention to the Resolution over seven 
years ago. However, Nolan has outlined the limitations of socio-economic rights adjudication in Ireland (in 
the context of holding non-state actors to account, although there is also overlap regarding the state 
actor).160 It is arguable that a possible right to water and sanitation may run into similar challenges if it is not 
articulated in more meaningful ways, such as from the perspective of the commons as outlined herein. 
 
Suffice to say, the Irish Constitution provides for socio-economic rights-related provisions of both a justiciable 
and non-justiciable nature.161 The most prominent is Article 42 on the right to primary education. As alluded 
to under Article 40.3.1, many socio-economic rights are accorded constitutional status through 
unenumerated recognition. This provision states that: ‘the State guarantees under its laws to respect, and, 
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as far as practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen’ (emphasis added). 
It is ‘clear that this provision imposes a duty on the State to take positive action in appropriate 
circumstances.’162 Article 40.3.2 further provides that: ‘the State shall’ in particular by its laws protect at best 
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and 
property rights of every citizen.’ In her case analyses, Nolan points out that under some circumstances the 
Irish courts have broadened the obligation of the state to defend and vindicate these rights in the context of 
actors other than organs of the state. In Ryan v Attorney General (the seminal case regarding unenumerated 
rights) it was held that personal rights are not exhausted by life, person, good name and property rights’ 
expressly enumerated in Article 40.3.2. This was later confirmed by Supreme Court.163 Nolan however 
highlights a ‘general reluctance in recent years to recognise and give effect to such rights’ due to the 
implications adjudication of socio-economic rights is perceived to have on the separation of powers doctrine 
(classical constitutional liberal theory approach) and the court’s involvement in distributive justice.164 As a 
result, the Supreme Court has refused to recognised new unenumerated socioeconomic rights. She points 
out that it has gone so far as to question the existence of economic and social rights previously identified by 
other courts. 
 
A possible right to water and sanitation may therefore theoretically take several forms in Irish law. It may be 
constitutionally guaranteed through further judicial interpretation of unenumerated rights under Article 40.3 
although this is highly unlikely given its recent restrictive approach towards recognizing other socio-economic 
rights. There may also be a referendum which explicitly recognises this right, however this will require a much 
longer-term public advocacy campaign. Also perhaps the recent emergence of this right under international 
human rights law might itself play a role in interpretation and application of Constitutional protections. It 
may also be legislatively provided for under statute(s). Yet, whatever legal avenue may be employed, the 
precise scope, normative content and justiciability of such a right would need to be rethought of in light of 
the aforementioned conceptual framework and the Mazibuko case example. Indeed, even where 
international and regional human rights regimes have not (as yet) recognised a binding right to water and 
sanitation, such as the European Union, they have ‘long given ready support to key aspects of any such right, 
particularly the procedural aspects which serve to facilitate the meaningful and effective participation of 
affected individuals and communities in the making of administration decisions potentially affecting their 
water services. For example, the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention)165 provides the rights of the public (individuals and their associations) with regard to the 
environment, access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice. It may theoretically be utilised in advocacy strategies in the context of formulating a right to water 
and sanitation that places community before market and state. Or perhaps a distinct “Aarhus-type” of 
instrument can be pushed in terms of water and sanitation at the regional level utilising a broader eco-social 
approach. 
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Bakker has also put forward the public-public partnership (PPP) as ‘potentially powerful actually existing 
alternatives.’166 Herein in public water supply utilities with expertise and resources (typically large cities in 
the global North) are partnered with those in the South, as well as smaller urban centres in North also, whilst 
acknowledging the ‘political pitfalls,’ i.e. to be ‘promoted for less profitable communities allowing more 
private sector contracts to cherry pick profitable communities.’167 It is submitted that this type of PPP could 
also apply to communities and cities that are vulnerable to the discontents of regressive austerity measures. 
 
Bakker further suggests that ‘institutional support from multilateral agencies may be forthcoming’199 in this 
sense. For example, she cites the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation which 
requested that the UN support: 
 
… the creation of an international association of public water operators – encouraged by the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development’s official acknowledgement of the importance of public-
public partnerships and by specific campaigns by public utilities – notably Porto Alegre – 
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Indonesia, Holland, Honduras, France, South Africa and 
Sweden have initiated public-public partnerships, at times also entailing radical restructuring of 
management-worker relationships within water supply utilities168 (emphasis added). 
 
Bond maintains that a ‘crucial challenge for water rights advocacy is to transcend narrow juristic narratives’ 
that tend to be ‘individualistic, anthropocentric, state-centric, and compatible with private actor provision of 
water supply.’169 In the current Irish campaign for a legal recognition however, a mere call for right to water 
that precludes private actor participation would still face the same wall regarding state service provision. If 
it is to have genuine meaning the debate could heed the lessons of other domestic cases such as South Africa, 
interpret normative instruments in a manner that prioritises participatory rights, as well as utilise the 
approaches of alter-globalisation movements such as the commons and thereby re-orientate focus towards 
the central role of procedural rights in the right to water and sanitation. 
 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PRIORITISING COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS & STRATEGIC PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
 
The abovementioned South African and Irish experiences, whilst different in their own respective contexts, 
point to a very similar aim which is the desire to give the right to water and sanitation some critical meaning 
for communities beyond the narrow confines of legal technical (and purely economic) terms such as access, 
quantity and financial sustainability. 
 
In terms of learning from the Mazibuko case several comments and recommendations can be made. First, 
ensuring procedural detailed safeguards to any right to water remains essential, there is great potential for 
this to be progressively advanced in a country such as Ireland for reasons outlined in the previous section. 
Second, public participatory rights should be taken seriously from the onset of any public policy initiative as 
well as in the ongoing management and review of such water policies, and incorporated in robust, clear and 
consistent legal terms. However, this is not to say that community participation is without its own inherent 
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limitations, which any jurisdiction would do well to be aware of when formulating or re-(thinking) such a legal 
and/or conceptual notion. Bakker for example remains correctly cautious not to romanticise community 
control.170 She points out that much activism tends to see such forms of water supply management ‘as 
coherent, equitable social structures, despite the fact that inequitable power relations and resource 
allocation exists within communities.’171 
 
Indeed, there are many limitations to such resource management which can be overcome if approached in 
proactive ways. Communities are not historically egalitarian. For example, the gender asymmetries that 
remain for now still highly socially entrenched in patriarchal systems are acutely visible in socio-economic 
rights. In the context of water for example, in the global South, women and girls are the primary water-
bearers and are often the most vulnerable groups affected by rights violations. Financial crisis and fiscal 
austerity may exacerbate gender asymmetries more acutely. It rings true that, ‘research has demonstrated 
how cooperative management institutions for water common-pool resources can function effectively to 
avoid depletion.’172 However it also rings true that ‘other research points to the limitations of some of these 
collective action approaches in water.’173 In other words as Bakker succinctly puts it the ‘commons can be 
exclusive and regressive as well as inclusive and progressive.’174 Indeed as she concedes, ‘the role of the state 
in encouraging redistributive models of resource management, progressive social relations and redistribution 
is more ambivalent than those making calls for returns to the commons would perhaps admit.’175 It is 
submitted that domestic, regional as well as international articulations will need to refine their focus on these 
terms if a right to water and sanitation is to have concrete positive effect in the future (especially if 
considerations for a binding international treaty are to be taken seriously). 
 
On the public interest litigation front, there are significant hurdles that both the South African and a 
potentially Irish context will need to overcome in order to effectuate administrative and procedural justice. 
Clark proffers that the Mazibuko case is worth highlighting because ‘despite the unfavourable result, the 
applicants and the social movement that sponsored it did not regret their decision to litigate.’176 The value 
of advocacy is thereby ‘grounded in a much broader campaign against neoliberal policies to the delivery of 
basic social services.’177 Langford has noted that ‘any critique of litigation as a vehicle for social change is only 
sustainable if there are viable alternatives or if litigation makes the situation worse in the absence of 
alternatives.’178 
 
Dugard further elaborates on the potential for strategic public interest litigation in the area of socio-economic 
rights such as water and sanitation: 
 
rights can be useful to the left regardless of the ultimate outcome of litigation per se. Advocating a 
pragmatic approach to rights, I suggest that in contemporary South Africa, with its extreme socio-
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economic and racial inequalities, while in the normal course of events the law does indeed serve the 
interest of the elites, rights-based legal mobilisation can have a predominately positive impact on 
social movements representing disempowered groups, including the poor … If strategically used … 
may in certain circs offer the left an additional tactic in a broader political struggle. In some instances 
the additional tactic may be a last resort, but it remains a useful one.179 
 
As highlighted in this paper, leading scholars and practitioners remain equally cautious of “rights talk” whilst 
suggesting that a focus on property rights may prove more fruitful in the long term. It is submitted that the 
Mazibuko case does reflect some of these concerns raised in this paper. Any human right to water and 
sanitation and the discourse in this field generally ought to engage a more nuanced and critical reflective 
praxis especially countries that have the opportunity to articulate such a right anew, such as in the Irish legal 
system. Yet Bakker emphasises an important distinction that these jurisdictions ought to equally take heed 
of. It remains a central task to defend and extend a right to water although on its own it is not entirely 
satisfactory.180 It may be viewed as a useful tactic whereby ‘those without access legitimise their struggles 
not only for water but also for dignity.’181 Hence in an aspirational manner the right to water ‘can be a 
valuable tool, because it compels powerful to consider redistributive politics embedded in their water use 
practices. In other words human rights are not a solution but rather a strategy for creating the context in 
which claims for social and environmental justice can be pursued’ (emphasis added).182 She makes an 
important argument which is perhaps worth quoting in full here: 
 
A broad interpretation of human rights may be a useful conceptual antidote to what some term as 
the elite capture of the benefits of development. This arises because of a central conundrum 
underpinning the debate over the human right to water: while governments often recognize that 
unserved communities have legitimate claims to social services, they are frequently unable to 
provide those services and so deal with their claims on the basis of political expediency. In order to 
collectively apply informal pressure on governments to meet demands, these marginalized 
population seek to define themselves as communities with a clear identity … the social or 
consumption rights these groups demand are distinct from human rights which focus on individual 
right characteristics of Western liberal-rights frameworks. (Recent debates over social citizenship 
make a similar point).183 
 
In the final instance, human rights mobilisation in this field can enhance solidarity. Yet as Bakker 
appropriately puts forth: 
 
But what kind of solidarity and with whom? ... The most progressive politics, will seek new 
expressions of eco-social (socio-natural) justice that move us away from anthropocentric, 
individualist notions of human rights. A recent and suggestive example is the case of Bolivia, where 
politicians have been at the vanguard of the international movement in support of the human right 
to water, while simultaneously promoting environmental rights (notably the Ley de Derechos de la 
Madre Tierra and the revised Ley del Agua). The Bolivian case suggests that the irony of the growing 
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international consensus on the human right to water is that it may lead eventually to give rise to the 
conditions for its transcendence.184 
 
From a socio-legal perspective, the right to water and sanitation as it currently stands is at crucial juncture 
where the inter-section of law, policy and advocacy is particularly acute in terms of its potential to shape the 
content and future direction of what this right will mean in practice. This has significant implications with 
regard to holding key providers of water services accountable for prima facie violations of this emerging right. 
Therefore, this paper has attempted to explore both the theoretical and practical implications of the key 
elements of public community participation and strategic public interest litigation within this highly topical 
field of human rights law. It has been argued in this paper that both of these national experiences offer 
interesting ways of re-thinking a more nuanced normative content for the human right to water and 
sanitation in the future. 
                                                          
184 Ibid. 
